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AN OPEN LETTER TO THE OHIO SUPREME 
COURT: SETTING A UNIFORM STANDARD ON 
ANDERS BRIEFS 
MATTHEW D. FAZEKAS* 
 
ABSTRACT  
Attorneys are faced with an ethical dilemma when they represent indigent 
defendants who wish to appeal a criminal sentence, but that appeal would be frivolous. 
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court, in Anders v. California, introduced a 
procedure protecting the rights of indigent defendants that balanced the ethical 
concerns of an attorney forced to file a frivolous appeal. In 2000, the Court in Smith 
v. Robbins, held that the states can set their own procedure for the aforementioned 
ethical dilemma, so long as it protects the rights of indigent defendants in compliance 
with the Fourteenth Amendment. This has led many states to reject, follow, or modify 
the holding in Anders v. California. As of 2020, the Supreme Court of Ohio has yet to 
address whether it will follow Anders. Because of this, the twelve Ohio Appellate 
districts are left without adequate guidance, resulting in a district split where some 
districts follow Anders and others do not. Consequently, indigent defendants are 
receiving vastly different treatment on appeal throughout the state. The Ohio Supreme 
Court needs to address Anders to set a uniform procedure throughout the state. When 
it does, the Court should find that—with a few alterations—Anders v. California is a 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Ohio, “a lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding . . . unless there is a basis 
in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.”1 A lawyer must also “act with 
commitment and dedication to the interest of the client.”2 Ohio law grants criminal 
defendants a statutory right to appeal their criminal convictions.3 A conflict can arise 
when a lawyer is appointed to represent an indigent defendant on appeal and there is 
nothing of merit to appeal.4 Thus, under the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, that 
lawyer has a duty to not only pursue the appeal because of the client’s right to appeal, 
but also refrain from filing that appeal because it would be wholly frivolous.5  
The United States Supreme Court in Anders v. California sought to resolve this 
dilemma by developing a procedure whereby the lawyer would fulfill his ethical duty 
to not only serve the client’s right to appeal, but also refrain from filing a frivolous 
appeal.6 Additionally, this procedure protects an indigent defendant’s right to appeal 
because the defendant does not have an opportunity to hire a different lawyer if the 
defendant disagrees with the lawyer’s determination that the appeal is frivolous.
7
 
Under this procedure, appellate courts now accept what is known as an “Anders” brief. 
In these briefs, lawyers have the opportunity to address potential assignments of error, 
and then provide law to show why this likely is not an error.8 The appellate court then 
has an opportunity to review these potential errors and determine if the appeal has any 
merit.9 Finally, under this procedure there is no oral argument and the government 
does not need to file a brief with the court.10 
 
1 OHIO PROF. COND. R. 3.1. See also OHIO R. APP. P. 23 (“If a court of appeals shall determine 
that an appeal is frivolous, it may require the appellant to pay reasonable expenses of the 
appellee including attorney fees and costs.”). 
2 OHIO PROF. COND. R. 1.3(1). 
3 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.02 (1995) (“In a capital case in which a sentence of death 
is imposed for an offense committed before January 1, 1995, and in any other criminal case, 
including a conviction for the violation of an ordinance of a municipal corporation, the judgment 
or final order of a court of record inferior to the court of appeals may be reviewed in the court 
of appeals.”). See also OHIO R. CRIM. P. 32(B)(1) (“After imposing sentence in a serious 
offense, the court shall advise the defendant of the defendant's right, where applicable, to appeal 
or to seek leave to appeal the sentence imposed.”). 
4 See OHIO R. CRIM. P. 32(B)(3)(b) (“[I]f the defendant is unable to obtain counsel for an 
appeal, counsel will be appointed without cost”). 
5 This dilemma predominately applies to criminal proceedings. However, this same dilemma 
arises in a parental rights case. In Ohio, parents have the right to appeal the termination of 
parental rights. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(F) (2016). 
6 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 739, 744 (1967). 
7
 See, e.g., State v. Ortiz-Santiago, 100 N.E.3d 1127, 1132 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (citing 
Thruston v. Maxwell, 209 N.E.2d 204, 205 (Ohio 1965)). 
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In a subsequent decision, the United States Supreme Court determined that their 
decision in Anders was but one way to solve this issue.11 In response, state courts have 
affirmed, reformed, and even rejected Anders.12 However, the Ohio Supreme Court 
has not yet addressed this issue, resulting in confusion throughout the twelve Ohio 
appellate districts.13 Recently, three districts have rejected Anders while the other nine 
districts continue to follow Anders.14 Two of the nine districts that follow Anders have 
deviated from the original decision in Anders v. California.15 As a result, indigent 
defendants do not have equal protection under the law within the state of Ohio, and as 
will be discussed infra, sometimes they do not have equal protection within their own 
district.16 The Ohio Supreme Court needs to clear up the confusion surrounding 
Anders by setting a standard uniform procedure. When the justices on the Ohio 
Supreme Court set this standard, they should decide that Anders is appropriate to 
handle the ethical dilemma when an indigent defendant wishes to pursue an appeal 
that would be wholly frivolous. 
This Note discusses the original rationale behind Anders, subsequent United States 
Supreme Court decisions on Anders, state courts’ reactions to Anders, and, 
specifically, how Anders is applied in Ohio in Part II. Part III sets forth why the Ohio 
Supreme Court needs to set a uniform standard within the state of Ohio under the 
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part IV discusses why Anders is an appropriate 
solution to the aforementioned ethical dilemma. Within Part IV, Subsection A 
addresses the “independent review” component of Anders and the approach that the 
court takes in State v. Taylor. Then, Subsection B addresses why Anders is the most 
judicially efficient solution to the ethical dilemma of when a lawyer is faced with filing 
a frivolous appeal for an indigent defendant. Subsection C addresses the criticism of 
Anders that counsel argues against their client in an Anders brief. Next, Subsection D 
shows why prohibiting Anders ignores a lawyer’s ethical obligations, and Subsection 
E provides an illustration of why Anders is an appropriate procedural device to dispose 





11 Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 276–77 (2000). See also discussion on Smith infra notes 
44–52. 
12 Cynthia Yee, The Anders Brief and the Idaho Rule: It is Time for Idaho to Reevaluate 
Criminal Appeals After Rejecting the Anders Procedure, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 143, 150–57 (2002). 
13 The Ohio Supreme Court recently had the opportunity in two cases to address this issue but 
dismissed them for being “improvidently accepted.” See State v. Bowshier, 154 Ohio St. 3d 39 
(Ohio 2018) (Fisher, J., dissenting); State v. Upkins, 154 Ohio St. 3d 30 (Ohio 2018) (Fischer, 
J., dissenting).  
14
 See infra notes 62, 64.  
15
 See infra note 69. 
16 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “No state shall . 
. . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1. See also OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 2 (“Government is instituted for their equal 
protection and benefit”). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss3/9
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Anders v. California 
In Anders v. California, the United States Supreme Court outlined counsel’s role 
when an indigent defendant wishes to pursue a statutory right to appeal yet that appeal 
would be wholly frivolous.17 In Anders, the defendant was convicted for felony 
possession of marijuana and wished to invoke his statutory right to appeal his 
conviction.18 Counsel advised the court by letter, with a bare conclusion, that the 
appeal had no merit, and that the defendant wished to file his own brief pro se.19 
Counsel did not inform the court why he believed the appeal had no merit.20 The 
defendant requested a new attorney, but that request was denied by the court.21 The 
defendant filed his brief pro se and lost.22 After losing the appeal, the defendant filed 
a writ of habeas corpus, which the California Court of Appeals and then the California 
Supreme Court denied.23 
Upon granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court concluded that 
“California's action does not comport with fair procedure and lacks that equality that 
is required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”24 The Court cited a line of cases which 
invalidated procedures  
where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's 
examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of 
arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a 
preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to shift 
for himself.25  
The Court laid out what is now known as the Anders procedure by looking to 
precedent, where it previously concluded that once counsel determines that the appeal 
is frivolous, he may file a motion to withdraw, and if the court agrees, the motion will 
be granted.26  
 
17 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).  




21 Id. at 740. 
22 Id. at 740, 743. Interestingly enough the California Supreme Court actually found an error, 
that the defendant failed to raise. At trial the judge and prosecutor made a point to the jury that 
the defendant failed to testify. The court found this in violation of Art. I, Sec.13, of the 
California Constitution. Unfortunately, the defendant waived this appeal because he did not 
raise this error in his brief.  
23 Id. at 740–41. 
24 Id. at 740. 
25 Id. at 741 (quoting Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
26 Id. at 741–42 (citing Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958)). 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
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Specifically, the Court found that counsel’s bare conclusion that the appeal was 
meritless was contrary to the Court’s holding in Eskridge v. Washington State Board.27 
In Eskridge, the trial court deprived an indigent defendant of the trial transcript 
because the trial court determined that “‘no grave or prejudicial errors’” existed.28 The 
Court in Eskridge invalidated this procedure stating there “cannot be an adequate 
substitute for the right to full appellate review available to all defendants who may not 
be able to afford such an expense.”29 The Court found that in Anders, the situation was 
similar because the California courts deprived the defendant of a right to look at the 
record or have an attorney look through the record on the defendant’s behalf.30 The 
Court ultimately determined that “California's procedure did not furnish [the 
defendant] with counsel acting in the role of an advocate nor did it provide that full 
consideration and resolution of the matter as is obtained when counsel is acting in that 
capacity.”31  
The Court in Anders based its decision on the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution.32 The Court determined that when appointed counsel finds that an appeal 
would be wholly frivolous, counsel must (1) find the appeal wholly frivolous after a 
conscientious examination of the record, (2) advise the court with a motion to 
withdraw, (3) file a brief with the court referring to anything in the record that might 
arguably support the appeal, and (4) send a copy of the brief to the indigent defendant 
and give the defendant time to file a brief pro se.33 If the court determines that the 
appeal is wholly frivolous “after a full examination of all the proceedings,” the court 
should grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.34 If, on the other 
hand, the court determines that there is an arguably meritorious appeal, then the court 
must afford the defendant the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.35 This 
procedure does not require the state (or city) to file a brief as the appellee and there is 
never an oral argument.36 
 
27 Id. at 742 (citing Eskridge v. Wash. State Bd., 357 U.S. 214, 215 (1958)). 
28
 Eskridge, 357 U.S. at 215.  
29
 Id. at 216. See also Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 485 (1963) (holding that depriving an 
indigent defendant access to a trial transcript violated constitutional standards). 
30
 Anders, 386 U.S. at 743. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 744 (“The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only 
be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate on behalf of his client . . . .”). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. Alternatively, the court may affirm the case depending on the law of the state. Id. 
35 Id. Justice Stewart, along with two other justices, are extremely skeptical of this procedure 
as well. “The fundamental error in the Court's opinion, it seems to me, is its implicit assertion 
that there can be but a single inflexible answer to the difficult problem of how to accord equal 
protection to indigent appellants in each of the 50 States.” Id. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
This ultimately turns out to be wrong as each state can decide what procedure they wish to 
follow. See discussion infra notes 46–53. 
36
 See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 81 (1988) (“The so-called ‘Anders brief’ serves the 
valuable purpose of assisting the court in determining both that counsel in fact conducted the 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss3/9
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B. Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions 
Three subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions developed the law 
surrounding Anders. First, in McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, Dist. 1, the 
Court addressed the validity of a Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule.37 The rule in 
question essentially restated the holding of Anders but added an additional 
requirement that counsel must provide “a discussion of why the issue lacks merit.”38 
The defendant’s counsel challenged the constitutionality of this additional 
requirement, which the Court labeled “the discussion requirement.”39 The Court held 
the discussion requirement was constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment 
because it satisfied the same objectives as Anders, went beyond the minimum 
requirement of Anders, and added an additional safeguard against mistaken 
conclusions that an appeal is frivolous.40 Thus, McCoy permitted states to go beyond 
the minimum requirements set forth by Anders.  
Second, in Penson v. Ohio, the Court suggested, but did not outright hold, that state 
courts must follow the minimum procedures set forth in Anders v. California.41 The 
Court reversed an Ohio Court of Appeals decision to allow counsel to withdraw from 
an appeal when counsel did not provide any support for why he determined the appeal 
was frivolous.42 When counsel determined the appeal was frivolous, he filed a 
document captioned “Certification of Meritless Appeal and Motion,” which simply 
provided that counsel carefully reviewed the record, found no error, would not file a 
meritless appeal, and requested to withdraw as counsel.43 The Court determined that 
counsel did not comply with Anders by failing to provide the court of appeals with a 
brief pointing to the record to assist the court with determining if the appeal was 
frivolous.44 Moreover, the Court determined that the Ohio Court of Appeals erred first 
by permitting counsel to withdraw without looking at the record, and second by not 
appointing new counsel to represent the defendants after finding “several arguable 
claims.”45  
Finally, in Smith v. Robbins, the Court changed its view on Anders by holding that 
Anders was but “one method of satisfying the requirements of the Constitution for 
 
required detailed review of the case and that the appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be 
decided without an adversary presentation.”). 
37
 486 U.S. 429, 430–31 (1988). 
38
 Id. at 430.  
39
 Id. at 430–32.  
40
 Id. at 442. 
41
 See generally Penson, 488 U.S. at 75.  
42
 Id.  
43
 Id. at 77–78. 
44
 Id. at 79. 
45
 Id. at 76. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
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indigent criminal appeals.”46 In this case, the Court looked at whether California’s 
Wende procedure was constitutional.47 California courts were not following the 
decision in Anders v. California.48 Instead, if counsel suspected the appeal was 
frivolous, counsel would request the appellate court to review the record without 
submitting a brief pointing to the record.49 If the appellate court found any arguable 
issue, counsel would be ordered to file briefs on the issue.50 If the appellate court did 
not find anything of merit to appeal, the case would be dismissed.51 The Court found 
“the Constitution ‘has never been thought [to] establish this Court as a rule-making 
organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure.”52 Furthermore, the 
Court stated that imposing a “single solution” went against its role as a court and 
should “evaluate state procedures one at a time, as they come before us.”53 With this 
in mind, the Court examined California’s Wende procedure independently of Anders 
and determined Wende did not violate the constitution because it provided adequate 
safeguards to indigent defendants on appeal.54  
C. State Courts’ Reaction to Anders 
California was not the only court to deviate from the requirements set forth by 
Anders v. California.
55
 In 1977, the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. McKenney, 
expressly rejected Anders by holding that the court would no longer grant motions to 
withdraw on the grounds that the appeal lacks merit or is deemed wholly frivolous by 
counsel.56 The court in McKenney held that by not permitting the motion to withdraw 
 
46
 Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 276–77 (2000). 
47
 Id. at 276. See also People v. Wende, 600 P.2d 1071, 1074–75 (Cal. 1979). Wende is 
discussed infra at notes 138–40. 
48
 Smith, 528 U.S. at 265–66. 
49






 Id. at 274 (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564 (1967)). 
53
 Smith, 528 U.S. at 275 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 
(1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“the more challenging task of crafting appropriate 
procedures . . . to the laboratory of the states in the first instance.”). 
54
 Smith, 528 U.S. at 278–79. 
55
 See People v. Wende, 600 P.2d 1071, 1074–75 (Cal. 1979). See also State v. Balfour, 814 
P.2d 1069, 1080 (Or. 1991) (adopting a standard similar to Wende that didn’t comply with the 
requirements of Anders v. California). 
56 State v. McKenney, 568 P.2d 1213, 1214–15 (Idaho 1977). Idaho was the prominent court 
to reject Anders. For an in-depth analysis of why other jurisdictions prohibited Anders, see 
Cynthia Yee, supra note 12 at 151–57. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss3/9
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they were extending the protection of Anders.57 Other jurisdictions, such as New 
Hampshire, Georgia, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia followed suit and 
prohibited Anders  briefs by following a similar rationale as the Idaho Supreme Court 
in McKenney.58 With the holding in Smith v. Robbins, the states were permitted to 
prohibit Anders briefs so long as prohibiting Anders is consistent with the Fourteenth 
Amendment.59 The United States Supreme Court has not addressed if prohibiting 
Anders is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. However, prohibiting Anders 
forces attorneys to always file an appeal, and it is unlikely the Court would hold that 
this is contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment because it always ensures that a 
defendant’s right to appeal is preserved.60 
D. The Current Landscape of Anders in Ohio 
Ohio has yet to set a uniform standard on how the state should handle frivolous 
appeals stemming from an indigent defendant. In June 2018, the Ohio Supreme Court 
had the opportunity to set a uniform standard but decided not to accept a challenge to 
Anders.61 Currently the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Ohio Appellate Districts have 
rejected Anders.62 As of writing this Note, all three decisions have come within the 
last four years, with the Seventh District rejecting Anders in June 2018.63 The rest of 
Ohio, for the most part, follows the original Anders procedure.64 As recently as 
 
57 McKenney, 568 P.2d at 1214–25. The court determined that they were preventing the 
situation where a motion to withdraw is rejected and then counsel would have to file an appeal. 
The court also determined that they were saving the judiciary time by focusing their attention 
only on the appeal and not various other motions. Further, if counsel was wrong and the appeal 
had merit then they were in the precarious situation of a conflict of interest between his duties 
to the client. 
58 Gale v. United States, 429 A.2d 177, 182 (D.C. 1981); Huguley v. State, 324 S.E.2d 729, 
730–31 (Ga. 1985); Commonwealth v. Moffett, 418 N.E.2d 585, 591 (Mass. 1981); State v. 
Cigic, 639 A.2d 251, 254 (N.H. 1994). 
59
 Smith, 528 U.S. at 276–77. 
60
 See, e.g., McKenney, 568 P.2d at 1214. The court implies that counsel must always file an 
appeal for an indigent defendant by stating “if a criminal case on appeal is wholly frivolous, 
undoubtedly, less of counsel and the judiciary’s time will be expended in directly considering 
the merits of the case.” Id. 
61 See supra note 13.  
62 State v. Wenner, 114 N.E.3d 800 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018); State v. Cruz-Ramos, 125 N.E.3d 
193, 197 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018); State v. Wilson, 83 N.E.3d 942, 955 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017).  
63 Interestingly, the Seventh District followed its own “Anders” procedure prior to the Cruz-
Ramos decision. The so-called Toney brief was different in only one aspect: as summarized in 
the Syllabus, counsel had to have “long and extensive experience in criminal practice.” State v. 
Toney, 262 N.E.2d 419, 419 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970), overruled by Cruz-Ramos, 125 N.E.3d at 
197. 
64 State v. Fiore, No. 17AP-835, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 3374, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 7, 
2018); In re M.B., No. 27956, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 3678, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 24, 
2018); State v. Watters, No. 2016-G-0068, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 2681, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 
June 30, 2017); State v. Hammond, No. 27793, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 3890, at *2 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Sept. 28, 2016); State v. Whiting, No. 103765, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 2083, at *2 (Ohio 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
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October 1, 2018, the Twelfth District reaffirmed its commitment to Anders but 
expressed concerns over the lack of uniformity within Ohio.65 The court stated, “Ohio 
courts have applied Anders in a variety of ways and there is no defined procedure from 
the Ohio Supreme Court to give guidance to appeals courts.”66 The confusion between 
appellate districts does not end at the border of neighboring districts. The Eighth 
District has two ways to handle Anders. Some judges in the Eighth District subscribe 
to the “independent review” role of the courts, where it is the duty of the court to comb 
through the entire record looking for potential error.67 Other judges believe that the 
court’s role is to only look at the record, in-so-much as it relates to the potential 
assignment(s) of error raised by counsel in the no-merit brief.68  
Currently, the trend is to reform or reject Anders. Five of the twelve Ohio appellate 
districts do not follow the standard set forth by Anders v. California. Three of those 
five districts have prohibited Anders briefs. With the split authority in the twelve Ohio 
appellate districts, indigent defendants are receiving vastly different treatment on 
appeal by their lawyers and by the courts. The Ohio Supreme Court needs to set a 
standard, like many other states have, so that every defendant in the state of Ohio has 
equal rights on appeal.69 Otherwise, indigent defendants are deprived of equal 




Ct. App. May 26, 2016); State v. Parrott, No. C-130476, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1106, at *2 
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2014); In re D.M.-S, Nos. CA2011-06-011, CA2011-07-014, 2012 
Ohio App. LEXIS 1466, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2012); In re McBrayer, No. CT2008-
0017, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 3736, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2008); State v. Meeks, Nos. 
1-98-28, 1-98-29, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 933, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 18, 1999). The First 
District still allows Anders briefs for criminal matters but has rejected Anders for parental rights 
cases. See In re J.M., No. C-130643, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 6206 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 24, 
2013).  
65 State v. Lawrence, 121 N.E.3d. 1, 4 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). 
66
 Id. at 4.  
67 See, e.g., Whiting, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 2083, at *1–2. This conflict in the 8th District 
is reflective in a recent opinion in State v. Sims, No. 107724, 2019 WL 6606556, *1 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Dec. 5, 2019). In Sims, one judge wrote for the majority, one judge wrote a concurring 
opinion, and one judge wrote a dissenting opinion. The majority opinion affirmed the use of 
Anders briefs. Id. at *3. The dissenting Judge acknowledged the inter-district spilt on Anders by 
stating “a three-judge panel of this court subsequently held that the ‘independent examination’ 
be limited to those issue that appellate counsel raised in the Anders brief.” Id. at *9 (Boyle, J., 
concurring). This was not the first time Judge Boyle expressed her frustration with spilt on 
Anders in the 8th District. See State v. Anderson, No. 103490, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 2194, at 
*7 (Ohio Ct. App. June 9, 2016) (Boyle, J., concurring). 
68 State v. Taylor, No. 101368, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 384, at *13–15 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 
5, 2015). The concept of the “independent review” will be discussed infra at notes 96–103. 
69 For more on which states have set uniform standards see Martha Warner, Anders in the 
Fifty States: Some Appellants’ Equal Protection is More Equal Than Others’, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 625 (1996). 
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III.  SETTING A UNIFORM STANDARD: THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Currently, depending on where indigent defendants are arrested in Ohio, their 
rights on appeal differ. For example, the line separating Lorain County and Erie 
County separates a district that follows Anders and a district that rejects it.70 Let’s say 
a defendant resides in Lorain County. This defendant goes to a bar in Erie County and 
drinks one too many alcoholic beverages. On his way home, he is pulled over and 
subsequently charged with a DUI. This defendant’s rights on appeal change solely on 
whether he was pulled over in Lorain County or whether he was pulled over in Erie 
County. Because Erie County lies within the 6th District’s jurisdiction, counsel would 
be unable to file an Anders brief, whereas in Lorain County, which resides in the 9th 
District, counsel could file an Anders brief.71 A arbitrary difference of 500 feet is the 
difference between two completely different sets of rights on appeal for an indigent 
defendant. 
This example shows how defendants in Ohio receive different treatment on appeal 
solely based on the location of the crime. The Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires the state to justify why its laws affect one group in a 
way that’s different than another group.72 While the laws that put the indigent 
defendants in jail are uniform throughout the State of Ohio, their rights on appeal are 
anything but uniform. The Ohio Supreme Court has failed to address this lack of 
uniformity and provide a reason why the laws affect one group of indigent defendants 
more than another. In two recent decisions, where the Ohio Supreme Court could have 
addressed Anders, the court dismissed both cases as being “improvidently accepted.”73 
The court announced to the lower courts that it was up to the individual districts to 
handle Anders. Justice Fischer dissented in both cases and stated that “[a]t a minimum, 
this court must provide guidance to the lower courts as to how to apply Anders 
consistently and correctly.”74 
A. Overall Lack of Uniform Guidance  
Without guidance from the Ohio Supreme Court, appellate districts are left to their 
own devices. Seven of the twelve districts still follow the original Anders decision 
from 1967.75 In these opinions, the courts do not delve into the requirements of Anders 
 
70 Lorain County resides in the Ninth District which follows Anders, and Erie County resides 
in the Sixth District which prohibits Anders. 
71
 See supra note 70. 
72 William Eskridge, Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. 
REV. 1183, 1188 (2000). 
73 State v. Bowshier, 154 Ohio St.3d 39 (Ohio 2018); State v. Upkins, 154 Ohio St.3d 30 
(Ohio 2017). 
74 Bowshier, 154 Ohio St.3d at 40 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
75 See State v. Troy, No. CA2018-01-008, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 3608, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Aug. 20, 2018) (“Counsel for appellant, Michael G. Troy, has filed a brief with this court 
pursuant to Anders v. California.”); State v. Ojezua, No. 27768, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 4125, 
at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2018) (“[a]ssigned counsel filed a brief under the authority of 
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or discuss the procedure in any detail. The courts simply provide a brief statement that 
“counsel has filed this brief pursuant to Anders v. California” and then dismiss the 
case for being frivolous. As a result, courts receive vastly different briefs when they 
are filed pursuant to Anders v. California. For example, in State v. Wilson, the Fourth 
District court stated that it has “accepted Anders briefs that identify and support 
potentially meritorious issues, briefs that argue the issues are frivolous, and split-
personality briefs that argue both the merits and frivolity of the issues.”76 This is the 
unfortunate situation of Anders in Ohio where lawyers do not know what exactly to 
file because the courts provide little guidance, contrary to the role of the appellate 
court to provide guidance and clarity to lawyers through their opinions.77 This overall 
lack of guidance only ensures that lawyers are protected because Anders shields 
lawyers from breaching their ethical duty. However, indigent defendants are not 
protected because of the vastly different treatment their lawyers and the courts give 
them. 
Some courts have acknowledged this confusion and lack of guidance. For example, 
in State v. Taylor, the Eighth District Court of Appeals stated: 
Before addressing the merits of the motion to withdraw as counsel, we 
think it provident to address the duties of defense counsel when filing an 
Anders brief and those of the court of appeals when ruling on motions to 
withdraw as counsel on grounds that an appeal would be frivolous. The 
Ohio Supreme Court has not addressed either of these issues, and because 
there are differences in the manner in which appellate courts review 
motions to withdraw as counsel, we believe some discussion is warranted.78 
The effects of this discussion are extremely beneficial to lawyers who file Anders 
briefs because they now know what the expectations are for an Anders brief filed in 
the Eighth District.79  
 
Anders v. California.”); State v. Green, No. 2017-T-0073, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 3837, at *1 
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2018) (“[a]ppellate counsel has filed a brief and requested leave to 
withdraw, pursuant to Anders v. California.”). 
76 State v. Wilson, 83 N.E.3d 942, 951 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). 
77 Malia Reddick, Evaluating the Written Opinions of Appellate Judges: Toward a Qualitative 
Measure of Judicial Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 547, 547 (2014). Reddick argues,  
[t]he written opinion is an appellate judge's primary work product. How a case is 
decided determines the fate of the parties, but the explanation of that decision often 
establishes precedent, laying out guidelines for deciding future cases dealing with 
similar issues. The soundness of the legal reasoning and the clarity with which it is 
communicated determine the impact of the decision.  
Id. 
78 State v. Taylor, No. 101368, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 384, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 5, 
2015). 
79
 A subsequent decision in the Eighth District confirms this assertion. For example, the court 
in State v. Anderson cites to State v. Taylor by stating “[t]he no-merit brief considered four 
possible issues . . . [w]e examine those arguments in light of the record and legal precedent.” 
State v. Anderson, No. 103490, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 2194, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 9, 
2016). The court in State v. Spicer did the same thing by citing to State v. Taylor when 
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Another example is the Twelfth District in State v. Lawrence.80 In that case, the 
court detailed the state of Anders after determining that “there has been little 
uniformity in the manner in which states protect the rights of indigent defendants in 
Anders-type situations.”81 Within this opinion are numerous examples of what the 
Twelfth District now expects when counsel files an Anders brief.82  
B. The Futility of Attempting to Provide Guidance 
Both the Eighth and Twelfth District’s attempts at providing guidance were futile. 
For example, some judges in the Eighth District do not follow the decision in State v. 
Taylor.
83
 The court in State v. Taylor narrowly defined the court’s role when deciding 
an Anders appeal.84 Other judges in the Eighth District do not subscribe to how the 
court in State v. Taylor defined the court’s role and refuse to follow it.85 Judges 
disagreeing about how to handle Anders is not unique to the Eighth District. 
The Fourth District did not unanimously agree to prohibit Anders briefs.86 In a 
subsequent decision to State v. Wilson, Judge McFarland of the Fourth District wrote 
a dissenting opinion stating, 
I respectfully dissent and note I was not on the panel in State v. Wilson. 
While I recognize that the Anders process used in Ohio may not be perfect, 
I believe a better approach, if change is warranted, would have been to seek 
rule changes at the Ohio Supreme Court because of the constitutional and 
ethical harmonics at play. This approach allows any stakeholders involved 
 
addressing the Anders standard. State v. Spicer, No. 104081, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 3279, *1–
2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2016). 
80
 See generally State v. Lawrence, 121 N.E.3d. 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at *8 (“Therefore, we find that counsel must view an ‘arguable issue’ broadly and on 
finding an arguable issue, must file a merit brief even if counsel considers the arguments 
unlikely to prevail or anticipates a strong argument in reply from the prosecution.”); Id. at *9 
(“Finally, if an Anders brief is filed with this court, counsel must serve a copy of the brief on 
the defendant and inform the defendant that he may file a pro se brief if he so desires.”) 
(emphasis added). 
83
 See infra note 85. 
84 State v. Taylor, No. 101368, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 384, at *14–16 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 
5, 2015). 
85 State v. Whiting, No. 103765, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 2083, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 26, 
2016). See also State v. Anderson, No. 103490, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 2194, at *7 (Ohio Ct. 
App. June 9, 2016) (Boyle, J., concurring) (“I write separately to express my view that State v. 
Taylor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101368, 2015-Ohio-420, expressly contradicts our role as a 
reviewing court set forth in Loc. R. 16(C).”); State v. Hall, No. 103760, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 
2745, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. July 14, 2016) (Gallagher, J., concurring) (“In my view, Taylor 
expressly contradicts our role as a reviewing court set forth in Loc. R. 16(C), as well as 
reviewing courts' role under Anders.”). 
86 State v. Wilson, 83 N.E.3d 942, 951 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017).  
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to have input via the public comment period if they so desire and assists in 
the interests of judicial economy.87 
Judge McFarland’s opinion shows that in any appellate district there are going to 
be disagreements between judges and the best way to prevent such disagreements is 
by letting the Supreme Court handle a contested issue.88 
While the courts in State v. Taylor and State v. Lawrence tried to clear up the 
confusion surrounding Anders, their efforts to provide clarity were fleeting because 
some judges may not apply those cases. Therefore, even in the districts that have tried 
to set guidance, lawyers will still be left to file an Anders brief pursuant to the 1967 
decision in Anders v. California, except now there is even more confusion surrounding 
proper procedure because of inter-district disagreements and even intra-district 
disagreements between judges.  
C. Why the Equal Protection Clause Requires the Ohio Supreme Court to 
Set a Uniform Standard. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that the state 
will not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”89 
The United States Supreme Court stated in Smith v. Robbins, the Fourteenth 
Amendment “require[s] that a State's procedure ‘affor[d] adequate and effective 
appellate review to indigent defendants.’”90 Currently, because of the lack of guidance 
on Anders, Ohio courts are not providing adequate and effective appellate review to 
indigent defendants and, therefore, are violating the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Moreover, within each individual district, indigent defendants are receiving 
unpredictable treatment from their lawyers and the court. For example, the Eighth 
District has an opinion that gives guidance to lawyers on Anders but is not followed 
by all the judges.91 The Twelfth District has a leading opinion but there is no guarantee 
 
87 State v. Gillian, No. 16CA11, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 3700, at *9–10 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 
21, 2017) (McFarland, J., dissenting). 
88
 The court in State v. Cruz-Ramos avoided this issue all together by sitting per curiam as 
opposed to a three-panel bench. State v. Cruz-Ramos, 125 N.E.3d 193, 194 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2018). The Courts of Appeals also have the power to certify the conflict to the Ohio Supreme 
Court. See OHIO CONST. art. 4, § 4(B)(4) (“Whenever the judges of a court of appeals find that 
a judgment upon which they have agreed is in conflict with a judgment pronounced upon the 
same question by any other court of appeals of the state, the judges shall certify the record of 
the case to the Supreme Court for review and final determination”). 
89 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Ohio Constitution also has an Equal Protection Clause. 
OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 2 (“Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit . . . .”). 
An analysis into the Ohio Constitution is not necessary because “[t]he limitations placed upon 
governmental action by the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States 
Constitutions are essentially identical.” Daugherty v. Wallace, 621 N.E.2d 1374, 1382 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1993). See, e.g., Porter v. Oberlin, 1 Ohio St.2d 143, 205 N.E.2d 363, 367 (Ohio 1965). 
90
 Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 276 (2000). 
91 See State v. Taylor, No. 101368, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 384, at *14–16 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Feb. 5, 2015). See also State v. Anderson, No. 103490, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 2194, at *7 
(Ohio Ct. App. June 9, 2016) (Boyle, J., concurring) (“I write separately to express my view 
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that there will not be an intra-district split like the Eighth District.92 The remaining 
appellate districts leave lawyers to their own devices without clear guidance other than 
the original decision in Anders v. California.  
This has caused complete disarray in the state of Anders jurisprudence within 
Ohio. An indigent defendant will always have their appeal briefed on the merits in the 
Fourth District.93 This also holds true for the Sixth and Seventh District.94 Within the 
Eighth District, some judges may look at the entire record or just at the record as it 
pertains to what was raised by counsel in their brief.95 The Twelfth District sets its 
own parameters for an Anders brief that do not appear in the original Anders v. 
California decision.96 The Twelfth District requires “that counsel must view an 
‘arguable issue’ broadly and, on finding an arguable issue, must file a merit brief even 
if counsel considers the arguments unlikely to prevail or anticipates a strong argument 
in reply from the prosecution.”97 Finally, in the rest of the remaining seven appellate 
districts there is zero guidance on Anders briefs and there is no way to tell how vastly 
different the treatment indigent defendants receive within these districts.  
Therefore, an indigent defendant in the Second District does not have the same 
protection under the law as an indigent defendant in the Eighth District. That defendant 
in the Eighth District does not have equal protection under the law as an indigent 
defendant within the Fourth District. The attempts to provide guidance by the appellate 
courts have proved futile. Thus, indigent defendants are not consistently afforded 
“adequate and effective appellate review’” as required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.98 
The Ohio Supreme Court can easily solve this problem. By setting a uniform 
standard, all twelve appellate districts will be bound by one consistent procedure. 
Every indigent defendant in Ohio would receive the same treatment on appeal if the 
Ohio Supreme Court sets a standard. While appellate courts could possibly interpret 
that new decision in different ways, the disparity in interpretation of Anders would be 
 
that State v. Taylor, expressly contradicts our role as a reviewing court set forth in Loc. R. 
16(C).”). 
92 State v. Lawrence, 121 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). 
93 State v. Wilson, 83 N.E.3d 942, 952 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (“If counsel believes the appeal 
to be frivolous, counsel should inform the defendant and try to persuade the defendant to 
abandon the appeal. If the defendant chooses to proceed with the appeal nonetheless, counsel 
must file a merit brief and argue the defendant’s appeal as persuasively as possible regardless 
of any personal beliefs that the appeal is frivolous.”). 
94 State v. Wenner, 114 N.E.3d 800, 804 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (“A criminal defense attorney 
must proceed with a basis in law (procedural and substantive) and fact.”); State v. Cruz-Ramos, 
125 N.E.3d 193, 197 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (“If the defendant does not wish to dismiss the appeal 
after consulting with counsel, then counsel must file a merit brief.”). 
95 See generally Taylor, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 384, at *14–16. See also Anderson, 2016 
Ohio App. LEXIS 2194, at *7 (Boyle, J., concurring) (“I write separately to express my view 
that State v. Taylor, expressly contradicts our role as a reviewing court set forth in Loc. R. 
16(C).”). 
96 Lawrence, 121 N.E.3d at 4. 
97
 Id. at 8. 
98
 Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 276 (2000). 
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less problematic than if the lower courts are left to their own devices. The courts would 
be interpreting a detailed decision from 2020, or later, instead of one paragraph from 
a sixty-year-old opinion. The next question is which direction Ohio should take on 
handling an indigent defendant’s right to appeal when that appeal would be wholly 
frivolous. 
IV. THE STANDARD THE OHIO SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT 
The Ohio Supreme Court should adopt the overall procedure set forth in Anders v. 
California with two deviations.99 First, counsel should draft the statement of facts and 
law of the case in the no-merit brief, but not conclude whether the appeal is frivolous. 
This will prevent counsel from arguing against his client and allow the court to avoid 
taking the role of an advocate. Second, the court should adopt the State v. Taylor 
approach to the “independent review.” Under this approach, the court would only look 
through the record as it pertains to the points raised by counsel or by the defendant in 
a pro se brief.  
Furthermore, an Anders procedure should be adopted because as will be shown in 
Subsection IV.B, it is a much more judicially efficient way to handle a frivolous appeal 
than forcing counsel to brief the case on the merits. Moreover, jurisdictions that 
prohibit Anders briefs ignore lawyers’ ethical obligations, whereas Anders addresses 
those concerns. Finally, Ohio case law shows that Anders is an effective procedural 
device to dispose of frivolous appeals. 
A. The Independent Review and the State v. Taylor Approach 
1. The Independent Review: Unequal Protection of Appellants 
The final requirement of an Anders appeal is that “the court—not counsel—then 
proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is 
wholly frivolous.”100 Most courts have interpreted this to require the appellate court 
to look at the entire record to see if any error exists.101 In Ohio, the Eighth District 
Court in State v. Taylor took a different approach, where the court is only to look at 
the record as it pertains to the points raised by counsel in the no-merit brief.102 This 
approach is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
 
99 Counsel must (1) find the appeal wholly frivolous after a conscientious examination of the 
record, (2) advise the court with a motion to withdraw, (3) file a brief with the court referring 
to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal, and (4) send a copy of the brief 
to the indigent defendant and give the defendant time to file a brief pro se. See Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
100 Id. 
101 See, e.g., State v. Weese, No. 2013-CA-61, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 3186, at *5 (Ohio Ct. 
App. July 25, 2014) (“We also have performed our duty under Anders to conduct an independent 
review of the record. We thoroughly have reviewed the various filings, the written transcript of 
the plea colloquy, and the sentencing disposition.”). 
102 See State v. Taylor, No. 101368, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 384, *14–16 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 
5, 2015). 
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Amendment.103 Under the independent review formulation of the final requirement set 
forth by Anders v. California, an indigent defendant receives greater treatment by the 
appellate court than would a non-indigent defendant.104 An illustration on how these 
two formulations work helps to conceptualize this point. 
Consider two defendants, Defendant Dave and Defendant Adrian, who are both 
found guilty of the exact same crime. They both go to trial and the same exact evidence 
is presented at trial. Every objection and every argument made is exactly the same. 
They are both sentenced to ten years in prison for the exact same reasons. Both 
defendants wish to elect their right to appeal their ten-year sentence. There is one 
difference between the two defendants. Defendant Dave is declared indigent and 
Defendant Adrian is represented by counsel she paid for. 
Defendant Dave’s counsel determines that the trial court did not err and decides to 
file an Anders brief. Defendant Dave’s counsel diligently looks through the record and 
raises one potential error: “the trial court erred in admitting the email from Defendant 
Dave to the victim.” The court, under the independent review formulation would 
address the potential assignment of error and then conduct its own independent review 
of the record. While conducting its independent review, the court would look for any 
other error the trial court committed that was not raised by the Defendant Dave’s 
counsel. For example, the court could conclude that the verdict rendered against 
Defendant Dave was potentially against the manifest weight of the evidence and 
appoint new counsel to argue the appeal.105 
 Now turning to Defendant Adrian, his counsel thinks it would be a long shot, but, 
after diligently looking through the record, determines there is some merit to an appeal 
and also cites one assignment of error: “the trial court erred in admitting the email 
from Defendant Adrian to the victim.” The court would only look to the record as it 
pertains to the assignment of error raised. The court would not look for other error not 
raised by counsel. The court would spend less time on Defendant Adrian’s appeal than 
Defendant Dave’s. Thus, under this hypothetical scenario, the defendant who had a 
frivolous appeal received more attention from the court than a defendant who had a 
meritorious appeal. While technically both appeals would be “frivolous,” because 
counsel for Defendant Dave believed the appeal had merit, the court will spend less 
time on his appeal.  
What was described above does not just happen in the realm of hypotheticals. In 
State v. Wright, the court explicitly provided more protection to an indigent defendant 
filing an Anders brief than if an Anders brief was not filed.106 The court stated, 
[n]ormally, due to the fact Appellant did not raise a constitutional argument 
. . . further analysis would be foreclosed. However, in the context of an 
 
103 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 745 (“This procedure will assure penniless defendants the same 
rights and opportunities on appeal—as nearly as is practicable—as are enjoyed by those persons 
who are in a similar situation but who are able to afford the retention of private counsel.”). 
104 Ironically, this is contrary to the original holding in Anders, where the court wanted to 
ensure indigent defendants were receiving the same treatment as a non-indigent defendant on 
appeal. See id. at 744–45. 
105
 See id. at 744. 
106
 State v. Wright, Nos. 15CA3705, 15CA3706, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 4659, at *12 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2016). 
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Anders review, where we fully examine the trial court proceedings, we have 
also analyzed Appellant's speedy trial claim within the constitutional realm. 
We also find no constitutional violation.107  
If a meritorious appeal were filed in Wright, with the same assignments of error as 
the Anders brief in that case, the court would not have analyzed any constitutional 
claims because they were not raised in the brief. However, because of the independent 
review requirement, the court in Wright was able to address any feasible issue and 
decided to address constitutional concerns.108 Under State v. Taylor, the court in 
Wright would only be able to address the errors raised in the brief, and would not be 
permitted to address any constitutional issues. 
2. A Criticism of the State v. Taylor Approach 
The Seventh District was critical of the approach in Taylor as an alternative to the 
traditional “independent review” approach.109 The court determined that this approach 
was unrealistic as many common criminal appeals (such as a manifest weight 
challenge or an appeal on a plea) would still require a full review of the record.110 The 
Seventh District’s rationale is flawed, however, as it ignores the purpose of only 
looking at the potential assignment(s) of error. If the only point raised in an Anders 
brief was a manifest weight of the evidence challenge, the appellate court would only 
look at the evidence to determine whether the state proved the defendant’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court would not be required to then analyze every 
objection made by counsel, every procedural motion made, whether the evidence was 
properly admitted, whether the trial judge abused its discretion by imposing a 







 For a further discussion into this issue see Warner, supra note 69, at 662. 
109 State v. Cruz-Ramos, 125 N.E.3d 193, 196 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (“[o]ften, the result of 
this procedure is that a case with no nonfrivolous issues receives a much more extensive review 
than a case in which specific assignments of error are raised by counsel.”). 
110 Id. 
111 This is consistent with the requirement that counsel must conduct “a conscientious 
examination” of the record before counsel can determine that the appeal is wholly frivolous. 
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. If the court had a duty to conduct its own independent review why 
would counsel need to make “a conscientious examination” of the record? This formulation 
would be in line with the pre-Anders decision in Ellis v. United States, where the court held that 
counsel’s only requirement was to provide the court with a motion to withdraw stating the 
appeal was frivolous. Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958). Anders adds the 
requirement for counsel to assign potential assignment of error to help the court in its 
examination of potential error. If the independent review was the proper procedure the court in 
Anders would not have added this requirement. Anders, 386 U.S. at 745. 
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3. The State v. Taylor Approach Solves Many Common Criticisms of 
Anders. 
A common criticism of Anders is the “independent review” and is used as a 
justification to prohibit Anders briefs because of the bizarre situation it causes where 
indigent defendants gain more protection than non-indigent defendants.112 Under a 
State v. Taylor formulation, the court provides the same amount of time and care on 
an Anders brief as they would a “meritorious” appeal. This formulation puts indigent 
and non-indigent defendants on a level playing field on appeal.113  
Another common criticism of the “independent review” is that it will waste judicial 
time and resources.114 However, the State v. Taylor approach resolves this issue as 
well by making Anders a judicially efficient option. An independent review 
formulation requires the court to look beyond what was briefed by counsel.115 The 
State v. Taylor approach only requires the court to look at the record as it pertains to 
the potential assignments of error raised by counsel.116 By applying a State v. Taylor 
approach, the court only needs to spend the same amount of time as they would on a 
non-Anders appeal.117 That begs the question, then why not just prohibit Anders and 
force counsel to brief on the merits, if the same amount of time is spent using a State 
v. Taylor formulation? The answer is quite simple: Anders cases do not require the 
state to file a brief or require an oral argument. Therefore, the State v. Taylor 
formulation reduces the amount of time spent on Anders appeals because less time 
will be spent reading through the record. 
A final criticism that State v. Taylor resolves is that the courts take on the role of 
counsel when disposing of Anders briefs.118 The situation where “the appellate judge 
feels obligated to act as lawyer and the appellate lawyer feels constrained to rule as a 
judge” does not exist under a State v. Taylor approach to the court’s role.119 Under that 
 
112 See Warner, supra note 69, at 663. “[T]he real problem with Anders is that it creates two 
distinct classes of appellate review for criminal defendants and results in a failure of equal 
protection.” Id. “[N]either the indigent defendant whose attorney does not file an Anders brief 
nor the nonindigent defendant gets this kind of review from the court.” Id. at 663. Warner sets 
forth the common criticism but does not suggest a way to fix this equal protection issue. The 
court’s role as set forth in State v. Taylor solves this issue. 
113
 See State v. Taylor, No. 101368, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 384, *14–16 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 
5, 2015). 
114
 See, e.g., Mosley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 599, 607–08 (Ind. 2009). 
115 See, e.g., Weese, No. 2013-CA-61, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 3186, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 
July 25, 2014) (“We have also performed our duty under Anders to conduct an independent 
review of the record. We thoroughly have reviewed the various filings, the written transcript of 
the plea colloquy, and the sentencing disposition.”). 
116 Taylor, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 384, at *14–16. 
117 Id. 
118 See State v. Cruz-Ramos, 125 N.E.3d 193, 196 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (citing Huguley v. 
State, 324 S.E.2d 729, 731 (Ga. 1985)) (Anders procedure “tends to force the court to assume 
the role of counsel for the appellant”). 
119 See Wilson, 83 N.E.3d at 945 (citing Gale v. United States, 429 A.2d 177,182 (D.C. 1981) 
(Ferren, A.J., dissenting)). See also Taylor, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 384, at *10 (citing United 
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formulation, the court is not required to go beyond their role of a non-Anders appeal. 
If the court follows the “independent review” formulation, then the court would 
assume the role of counsel because the court could find issues to appeal that counsel 
did not. However, the burden to comb through the entire record under a State v. Taylor 
approach would only be on counsel and not on the courts. Therefore, this approach 
frees the judiciary from the extra burden of combing through the record even if it does 
not pertain to the potential errors raised by counsel. 
B. Judicial Efficiency: Anders Clears Up Frivolous Appeals from Appellate 
Dockets 
Another common criticism is that, overall, Anders is not judicially efficient. 
However, such a criticism overlooks that Anders is much more efficient than forcing 
lawyers to file meritorious briefs. For example, the courts in Ohio that prohibit Anders 
briefs require the defense attorney to file a meritorious brief, even if the appeal would 
be “frivolous.”120 This leads to more of the court’s resources being devoted to appeals 
that could have been resolved through Anders. The standard procedure for an appeal 
is that the appellant files their notice of appeal and then a brief pointing to assignments 
of error.121 The appellee then files a brief refuting the assignments of error.122 Then, 
the court reviews both briefs and allocates time for an oral argument.123 Three judges 
then must preside over the oral argument. However, while Anders still has three judges 
rule on the case, Anders only requires that defense counsel file a brief (and sometimes 
the defendant pro se), and there is no oral argument. 
When the Sixth District prohibited Anders, the court determined that counsel must 
find something to appeal.124 They point to examples like legal sufficiency and manifest 
weight of the evidence arguments for appealable issues.125 These arguments require 
the appellate court to comb through the entire record.126 In a non-Anders situation, the 
 
States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d. 551, 552 (7th Cir. 1996)). The court in Wagner found “[the 
independent review] makes this court the defendant’s lawyer to identify the issues that he should 
be appealing on.” Wagner, 104 F.3d at 552. The court further noted “[t]he defendant ends up in 
effect with not one appellate counsel but (if he is lucky) six-his original lawyer, who filed the 
Anders brief; our law clerk or staff attorney . . . a panel of this court . . . .” Id. 
120
 See, e.g., Wilson, 83 N.E.3d at 952. “If the defendant chooses to proceed with the appeal 
nonetheless, counsel must file a merit brief and argue the defendant’s appeal as persuasively as 
possible regardless of any personal belief that the appeal is frivolous.” 
121
 OHIO R. APP. P. 3, 16(A).  
122
 OHIO R. APP. P. 16(B). 
123
 OHIO R. APP. P. 21(A). This rule mandates oral arguments for every appeal unless a local 
rule states otherwise. In these jurisdictions, if a party requests an oral argument the court must 
schedule an oral argument. 
124 State v. Wenner, 114 N.E.3d 800, 804–05 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). 
125 Id. at 804. 
126 See State v. Rawson, 62 N.E.3d 880, 890 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (“The relevant inquiry on 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
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state would also have to comb through the record. Lengthy trials often produce 
transcripts that are over 1,000 pages long. What if the argument made was frivolous? 
Ignoring the ethical concerns, by filing a meritorious appeal, the state must comb 
through the record and prepare for an oral argument. That brief would be extensive, 
as the state would not want to ruin their conviction. And if the appeal is “frivolous,” 
there would be numerous pieces of evidence to sustain a conviction. Therefore, the 
court must read two extensive briefs and preside over an oral argument to hear a 
frivolous appeal. 
Moreover, the overall time of appeals—Anders or non-Anders—to move through 
appellate dockets would increase if Anders was prohibited. The percentage of Anders 
cases compared to the overall criminal docket vary by jurisdiction, but range from 1% 
to 39%.127 In Ohio, this would range from a total of 71 cases to 2,777 cases.128 While 
this may not reflect the total amount of Anders dismissals, it is safe to say that “[f]or 
every one percent increase in oral argument rate, disposition time is increased by .03 
months.”129 Assuming that every lawyer would have filed an Anders brief in a 
jurisdiction that prohibits Anders, then the total increase in appellate dispositional 
times could range from approximately one day to approximately one month. Even 
assuming that 7%130 of the criminal caseload are Anders cases, the overall increase in 
dispositional times would be around six days. 
While six days may seem like a short period of time, the 7% increase in cases 
requiring oral argument would add six days for every appeal on the docket, not just 
criminal appeals.131 In the context of a civil case, “[i]t is only if the judiciary is 
accessible to potential plaintiffs that it can be seen as a real protector of their formal 
rights; and only if it is efficient will there not be huge delays in court decisions.”132 
The effect of forcing Anders appeals to be heard on the merits would have a large 
 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
308 (1979)). See also State v. Hall, No. 103760, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 2745, at *3 (Ohio Ct. 
App. July 14, 2016) (“[A]ppellate courts are charged with reviewing the record, weighing the 
evidence and credibility of the witnesses, and ultimately determining whether the jury so 
‘clearly lost its way’ and ‘created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that [the] conviction[(s)] 
must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’”). 
127 Warner, supra note 69, at 642–43. 
128 In 2017 there was a total of 7,120 Criminal appeals filed with Ohio Courts of Appeals. THE 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, 2017 OHIO COURTS STATISTICAL REPORT 10 (2017). However, the 1% 
estimate of 71 is likely far too low as urban districts like the First, Eighth, and Tenth have high 
rates of criminal cases. These three districts combined account for 2,634 of the total criminal 
appeals. Id. 
129 Robert K. Christensen & John Szmer, Examining the Efficiency of the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals: Pathologies and Prescriptions, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 30, 33 (2012). 
130 In 2017, 1,048 of the 7,120 criminal appeals were dismissed. 2017 OHIO COURTS 
STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 128, at 10. Assuming half of these dismissals were Anders 
based, the total percentage would be 7%. 
131 Id. 
132 Giovanni B. Ramello & Stefan Voigt, The Economics of Efficiency and the Judicial 
System, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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effect on all other cases that are meritorious.133 The appellate courts would have to 
spend more time on frivolous cases forcing meritorious cases to be delayed.134 
Therefore, it would be an unwise decision to prohibit Anders briefs because Anders 
provides a judicially efficient way of handling frivolous appeals. 
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in Mosley v. State, provides a counterargument by 
stating, “[r]equiring counsel to submit an ordinary appellate brief the first time—no 
matter how frivolous counsel regards the claims to be—is quicker, simpler, and places 
fewer demands on the appellate courts.”135 The court in that case prohibited Anders 
briefs and held that counsel must file a brief when appointed to represent an indigent 
defendant.
136
 The court reasoned that if counsel filed an Anders brief with the court 
and counsel was incorrect, the court would have to look at the same appeal again and 
spend time finding new counsel to argue on the merits.137 This is an accurate 
conclusion but overlooks the fact that not every Anders case requires the substitution 
of counsel. While the court may have to expend more time and resources on the rare 
occasion that requires the substitution of counsel, requiring every Anders-type appeal 
to be briefed on the merits, as previously discussed, would cause every Anders-type 
case to waste the judiciary’s time and resources. Understandably, it may seem 
inefficient to have to replace counsel and then look at the same case twice. However, 
it is more judicially efficient to handle Anders-type situations than requiring counsel 
to brief the case on the merits. 
C. Arguing Against the Client 
Another criticism of Anders is when “there is arguable merit in the appeal” counsel 
is then in a conflict of interest between his duty as a lawyer and his duty to his client’s 
best interest because the lawyer would be in effect arguing against his client.138 
California has its own version of Anders called the “Wende brief.”139 When filing a 
Wende brief, counsel does not raise any specific issues of law but simply requests the 
 
133 The appellate courts are already behind in their caseloads. For example, in 2017 every 
appellate district had less cases filed that year than total cases on their dockets. 2017 OHIO 
COURTS STATE REPORT, supra note 127, at 10–12. For example, the Fifth District had 263 
criminal cases pending from 2016 and the Eighth District had 298 civil cases pending from 
2016. Id.      
134 For example, a civil matter that goes to trial may take up to 5 years to resolve. See Michael 
Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 813, 814 (2000). Most civil matters take years to resolve. It would be unfair to 
those litigants to clog the courts with “frivolous” Anders cases that could be resolved without 
the need for oral argument. 
135 Mosley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 599, 608 (Ind. 2009). 
136
 Id. at 601–02.  
137 Id. at 608. 
138 State v. McKenney, 568 P.2d 1213, 1214–15 (Idaho 1977). 
139
 People v. Wende, 600 P.2d 1071, 1074–75 (Cal. 1979). See also discussion on Smith v. 
Robbins, supra notes 46–54. 
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court conduct an independent review of the record.140 This alleviates a conflict of 
interest where counsel is arguing against the client.141 The Oregon Supreme Court 
developed its own procedure based on Wende in State v. Balfour.142 The court in 
Balfour determined that in Oregon, counsel will submit one half of the brief that 
contains the factual history of the case and then the defendant herself will submit the 
second half of the brief with issues of law.143 Therefore, under Balfour, counsel does 
not actively conclude the appeal is frivolous and the defendant is not subject to the 
rules of professional conduct when she files a frivolous argument. 
Like the procedures in Wende and Balfour, Ohio should adopt a procedure that 
avoids arguing against the client. When filing an Anders brief, counsel must provide 
a statement of facts, point to potential assignments of error, and provide the standard 
of review for the courts. Moreover, counsel should not flat-out refute the potential 
assignments of error. By requiring counsel to not refute the potential assignment of 
errors, counsel is not arguing against the client. By giving the court a statement of 
facts pointing to the record and by providing the standard of review, the court can take 
on its traditional role of ruling on error, as opposed to searching for error. The court 
would then have to determine whether the potential assignments of error have merit 
just as the court would in a non-Anders situation. While the court would still be on 
notice that counsel believes the appeal is wholly frivolous, this formulation would 
prevent counsel from directly arguing against the client in the no-merit brief. Finally, 
by not arguing against the client, that same attorney could then file a non-Anders 
appeal if there were meritorious issues or the court could simply appoint new 
counsel.144 
Ohio should not directly adopt either the Wende or Balfour procedure. Under the 
Wende procedure, the court must conduct an independent review.145 As previously 
discussed, independent review provides more protection then is required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment,146 diverts too much time to frivolous appeals,147 and causes 
the courts to take on the role of an advocate.148 Under Balfour, too much is asked of 
the defendant by requiring her to provide the issues of law.149 Anders “requires that 
the indigent receive substantially the same assistance as one who can afford to retain 
 
140




 State v. Balfour, 814 P.2d 1069, 1080 (Or. 1991). 
143
 Id. 
144 Ironically if the court did just appoint new counsel, then they would always be granting 
the motion to withdraw. In a sense, the motion to withdraw is just a formality that accompanies 
the brief. 
145
 Wende, 600 P.2d at 1074–75. 
146
 See supra text accompanying notes 100–01, 107–08. 
147
 See supra text accompanying notes 109–12. 
148
 See supra text accompanying notes 113–14. 
149
 State v. Balfour, 814 P.2d 1069, 1080 (Or. 1991). 
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
604 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [68:581 
an attorney.”150 This places the burden of legal research (which has already been 
completed by counsel to determine that the appeal is frivolous) on the defendant. An 
indigent defendant would unlikely be well versed in legal research, and writing the 
second half of the brief would be more time consuming than if a lawyer drafted the 
brief. Considering that the appeal would lose given it is frivolous, this would waste 
the time and hope of the defendant. Therefore, while Wende and Balfour provide ways 
to avoid arguing against the client, both procedures are flawed and should not be 
adopted by Ohio. 
D. Prohibiting Anders Ignores the Ethical Obligations Required by a 
Lawyer 
Even without these criticisms, forcing a lawyer to always brief an appeal on the 
merits is problematic. When courts prohibit Anders, the lawyer must find something 
to appeal.151 However, if an appeal could have been filed as an Anders brief, then when 
that same case is filed as a meritorious appeal, the lawyer breaches Rule 3.1 of the 
Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct because it is frivolous.152 While Anders provides 
a safeguard to sanctions that would result from filing a frivolous appeal, prohibiting 
Anders does not provide any distinction for a court or appellee’s lawyer, and thus, 
appointed lawyers could be faced with unnecessary fines or sanctions for doing their 
court-appointed job. 
The court in State v. Wenner, points to comment 1 of Rule 3.1 to show that a lawyer 
would not be sanctioned if Anders is prohibited.153 That comment provides “[t]he 
lawyer's obligations under this rule are subordinate to federal or state constitutional 
law that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in 
presenting a claim or contention that otherwise would be prohibited by this rule.”154 
This is not convincing as the comment is not a binding rule and it is not hard to imagine 
 
150 Nickols v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d. 467, 471 (7th Cir. 1971). 
151 State v. Wenner, 114 N.E.3d 800, 804 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (“A criminal defense attorney 
must proceed with a basis in law (procedural and substantive) and fact.”); State v. Cruz-Ramos, 
125 N.E.3d 193, 197 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (“If the defendant does not wish to dismiss the appeal 
after consulting with counsel, then counsel must file a merit brief.”); State v. Wilson, 83 N.E.3d 
942, 952 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (“[I]f the defendant chooses to proceed with the appeal 
nonetheless, counsel must file a merit brief and argue the defendant's appeal as persuasively as 
possible regardless of any personal belief that the appeal is frivolous.”). The court in State v. 
McKenney also implies that a defense attorney must file a merit brief. State v. McKenney, 568 
P.2d 1213, 1214–15 (1977). “We further determine that if a criminal case on appeal is wholly 
frivolous, undoubtedly, less of counsel and the judiciary's time and energy will be expended in 
directly considering the merits of the case in its regular and due course as contrasted with a 
fragmented consideration of various motions.” Id. at 1214. See also Mosley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 
599, 607–08 (Ind. 2009); Commonwealth v. Moffett, 418 N.E.2d 585, 588 (Mass. 1981); 
Murrell v. People, 53 V.I. 534, 547–48 (V.I. 2010). 
152 “A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding . . . unless there is a basis in law and fact 
for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law.” OHIO PROF. COND. R. 3.1 (2017). 
153 Wenner, 114 N.E.3d at 804. See also Wilson, 83 N.E.3d 942 at 953–54. 
154 OHIO PROF. COND. R. 3.1 cmt. 3 (2017).  
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a court ignoring this comment when sanctioning a lawyer for filing a frivolous brief.155 
Rule 3.1 forces lawyers to file only meritorious claims and provides a punishment if 
they breach this rule. The court could not set a standard stating “a lawyer will not be 
sanctioned for representing an indigent defendant on appeal” because that will allow 
lawyers to be lazy. As a result, a busy attorney may file a borderline frivolous claim 
solely based on that protection. Moreover, this would reduce the protection of indigent 
defendants, which would be contrary to the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, it is 
impossible in a jurisdiction that prohibits Anders to safely allow lawyers to file 
frivolous appeals without the threat of sanctions. 
E. Anders is an Appropriate Procedural Device to Dispose of Frivolous 
Appeals 
A final concern courts have with Anders is that truly frivolous appeals are hard to 
come by.156 One Ohio judge, particularly, found it impossible for a criminal appeal to 
be frivolous because a defendant in Ohio has a right to appeal a conviction or 
sentence.157 A frivolous appeal is defined as “one which present no reasonable 
question for review”158 and “lacks any basis in law or fact.”159 A look into Ohio case 
law shows that frivolous appeals in criminal cases do exist. This shows why Anders is 
an appropriate procedural device to dispose of frivolous appeals. 
For example, a recent Eighth District case, State v. Black,160 illustrates a frivolous 
criminal appeal. A brief recitation of the procedural history will illustrate why this 
case presented a frivolous appeal. The defendant was found guilty of various crimes 
and was sentenced to fourteen years in prison.161 He then invoked his statutory right 
to appeal, and the appellate court found that the trial court improperly sentenced 
 
155
  The comments to the rules of professional conduct are not binding authority. See OHIO 
PROF. COND. R. Preamble (21) (“The comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the 
text of each rule is authoritative.”). 
156
 See, e.g., Wilson, 83 N.E.3d at 951–52.  
157
 State v. Christian, No. 2013–T–0055, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 4749, at *9–10 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Nov. 3, 2014) (O’Toole, J., Dissenting) (“[i]t logically follows that if an appeal is a matter 
of right in criminal proceedings in Ohio, how can an appeal be frivolous?”). 
158
 Talbot v. Fountas, 475 N.E.2d 187, 188 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Garritano v. Pacella, No. 
L–09–1256, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 1411, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2010); Siemientkowski 
v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 87299, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4072, at *¶12 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Aug. 10, 2016).  
159
 McCoy v. Ct. of App. of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988).  
160
 See generally State v. Black, No. 106879, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 4110 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Sept. 20, 2018) [hereinafter Black II].  
161
 State v. Black, No. 105197, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 4439, at *5, 21 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 
5, 2017) [hereinafter Black I]. 
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him.162 The case was remanded to sentence the defendant to eleven years in prison.163 
Subsequently on remand, the trial court resentenced the defendant to eleven years in 
prison.164 The trial court followed the appellate court’s order and properly sentenced 
the defendant pursuant to Ohio’s statutory guidelines.165  
The defendant then invoked his statutory right to appeal when he was 
resentenced.166 Given the procedural history of this case, the only available appeal for 
the defendant was whether the trial court properly resentenced him.167 Any other 
potential assignment of error was waived during the first appeal. Therefore, so long as 
the trial court followed the appellate court’s order, there was no error. Counsel for the 
defendant realized this and filed an Anders brief for the appeal on the resentencing.168 
Filing the appeal would be wholly frivolous because the trial court properly 
resentenced the defendant, so Anders was the appropriate method for filing this appeal.  
This case illustrates two benefits that Anders provides. First, this provided one 
extra layer of protection for the defendant. The defendant was able to have three judges 
look at his case one more time to ensure that eleven years was the proper sentence.169 
Second, this protected the lawyer from filing a frivolous brief on this issue. The trial 
court properly resentenced the defendant170 and the only available issue was 
resentencing. If the lawyer had to brief this case on the merits, like some jurisdictions 
in Ohio require, the lawyer would breach Rule 3.1 because the filing an appeal based 
on the resentencing would be frivolous. In conclusion, this case shows why Anders is 
an appropriate way to dispose of frivolous appeals. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The current state of appellate practice for indigent criminal defendants is non-
uniform in Ohio. Appellate districts have provided little-to-no guidance on what the 
duties are for a lawyer when faced with an Anders situation. The Ohio Supreme Court 
has ignored this issue for over sixty years, raising Equal Protection concerns. It is time 
for the court to set a uniform standard on Anders. The court should adopt Anders but 
should make two changes. The first change would be to remove the “independent 
review” requirement as it creates the bizarre situation where the court spends more 
time on a frivolous appeal than it would on a meritorious appeal. The second change 
would be to require counsel to provide law accompanied with the potential 
 
162
 Id. at *21. 
163








 Id. at *7. 
168
 Id. at *5. 
169
 See generally Black II, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 4110.  
170
 Id. at *9.  
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assignments of error, but not argue why they believe the appeal is frivolous. Moreover, 
the court should find that Anders provides the most judicially efficient manner of 
disposing of frivolous appeals. Finally, Anders provides the only solution that 
acknowledges the lawyers’ ethical obligations, whereas prohibiting Anders ignores the 
ethical obligations. In conclusion, the Ohio Supreme Court needs to clear up the 
confusion and lack of guidance surrounding Anders. Adopting Anders with the 
removal of the “independent review” and prohibiting counsel from arguing against is 
the best way to do so. 
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